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This is the first study to use an achievement test score to analyze whether the 
income gap between second-generation immigrants and natives is caused by a skill 
gap rather than ethnic discrimination. Since, in principle, every male Swedish citizen 
takes the test when turning 18, we are able to bring more evidence to bear on the 
matter by estimating the income gap for a very large sample of individuals who are 
of the same age and have the same years of schooling at the test date. Once the 
result of the Swedish Military Enlistment Test is controlled for, the income gap 
almost disappears for second generation immigrants with both parents born in 
Southern Europe or outside Europe. However, when using a regular set of control 
variables the income gap becomes overestimated. This difference in results is most 
likely explained by the fact that schooling is a bad measure of productive skills for 
these groups of second-generation immigrants. It indicates that they compensate for 
their lower probability of being employed by investing in (in relation to their skill 
level) more schooling than otherwise similar natives. 
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1. Introduction 
An earlier study by Rooth and Ekberg (2003) sheds light on the labor market outcomes of 
immigrants’ children born in Sweden, i.e. second generation immigrants.
1 The data allows 
identification of several different ethnic backgrounds as well as the parent composition, i.e. 
whether one or both parents of the individual are foreign born. The annual incomes of second 
generation immigrants are found to be lowest, compared to native incomes, for those with a 
Southern or non-European background. The income difference is smaller if one parent is born 
in  Sweden  compared  to  having  both  parents  foreign  born,  indicating  the  importance  of 
“Swedish-specific” human capital being transferred to the child from the Swedish-born parent. 
However, with a standard set of control variables, including age, region of residence, the 
local unemployment rate, marital status and years of schooling, Rooth and Ekberg cannot 
explain the income gap relative to natives. Explaining this income gap is the main purpose of 
this paper. It takes the Rooth and Ekberg study one step further by controlling for parental 
characteristics (including information on fathers’/mothers’ income and years of schooling in 
adolescence) and by introducing a complementary skill measure, the results of the Swedish 
Military Enlistment  Test, which  is a  mandatory test for almost all male Swedish teenage 
citizens, into the income equation.  
In this respect we mimic the study by Neal and Johnson (1996, henceforth NJ) which 
shows  that  the  black-white  wage  gap  is  foremost  caused  by  a  skill  gap,  using  a  similar 
cognitive  test  score  to  ours,  the  Armed  Forces  Qualification  Test  (AFQT),  as  their  main 
predictor in the wage equation. NJ also show that when estimating the wage equation the test 
score should not be entered into the model on top of all the other independent variables. 
Instead,  they  argue  that  only  exogenous  variables,  i.e.  variables  determined  before  labor 
market entry, should be included in the model specification. Otherwise the influence of ethnic 
discrimination on incomes might be overestimated. Their cognitive test score, taken before 
labor market entry and therefore not affected by labor market discrimination, is most suited to 
explaining differences in wages between whites and blacks compared to using an endogenous 
variable such as years of schooling or labor market experience. 
The group of second generation immigrants in Sweden is growing rapidly. In late 2002 
this group consisted of about 858,523 individuals of all ages, approximately ten percent of the 
                                                            
1 For  a  detailed  picture  of  the  labor  market  situation  of  second  generation  immigrants  in  other 
European countries see the special issue of the Journal of Population Economics in 2003, volume 16 
(4). See also the early studies by Chiswick (1977), Carliner (1980) and Borjas (1993) for the US.     3 
total Swedish population (see www.scb.se). In about 65 percent of the cases one parent was 
born in Sweden. The reason for the high proportion with one parent born in Sweden is that 
many immigrants in the 1950s and 1960s were single when they arrived. Further, according to 
the 1998 census a growing share of the second generation immigrants had a non-European 
background. Thirty-three percent of those up to 24 years of age were of non-European origin, 
while the corresponding figure was only about three percent for those aged 25-55. Hence, it is 
especially important to find out why the incomes of the non-Europeans lag behind native 
incomes. 
Our data is based on population registers and, hence, includes all individuals living in 
Sweden in 2003. However, since the number of females who have taken the Swedish Military 
Enlistment Test is very small (and selective), our study is restricted to males. We follow the 
strategy by Rooth and Ekberg (2003) in that we divide the second generation immigrants into 
different groups based on the parents’ characteristics and origins, and analyze the income gap 
between natives and each of the second generation immigrant groups separately. Secondly, 
we use the cognitive test score as the sole predictor of the income gap between natives and 
each of the second generation immigrant groups. The share of the income gap explained with 
the test score will be compared to the share explained with the regular set of control variables; 
here, special interest will be given to the schooling variable. 
Since  there  has  been  concern  about  whether  the  test  score  is  actually  exogenous,  a 
discussion  has  taken  place  about  whether  schooling  should  be  included  in  the  income 
equation or the test score should be schooling-adjusted before use (Carneiro et al., 2005). 
Since, in principle, every male Swedish citizen takes the test when turning 18, we are able to 
bring more evidence to bear on the matter by estimating the income gap for a very large 
sample of individuals who are of the same age and have the same years of schooling on the 
test date. We also analyze whether the test might be ethnically biased and which cognitive 
ability, verbal or technical/mathematical skills, is most important for explaining the income 
gap between second generation immigrants and natives. 
We  find  that  for  second  generation  immigrants  with  both  parents  originating  from 
Southern Europe or outside Europe the income gap is almost entirely explained by differences 
in  skills.  However,  using  a  regular  set  of  control  variables,  including  schooling,  the 
unexplained income gap is significantly larger for these groups. A sensitivity analysis also 
shows that the Enlistment test does not have to be schooling adjusted before use, and that the 
test does not seem to be ethnically biased.   4 
Before continuing it should be noted that the Enlistment test does not seem to play an 
active  role  in explaining the employment  gap between  second generation immigrants and 
natives, see Table A1 in appendix. Neither the test score nor any other factor explains the 
employment gap between second generation immigrants and natives. Hence, an analysis of 
the employment gap between natives and second generation immigrants is not pursued any 
further in this study and is left for future research. However, we will return to these results in 
the conclusions.  
Previous research on ethnic discrimination and second generation immigrants is further 
surveyed in section 2. Section 3 contains the data and descriptive statistics are presented. 
Section 4 reports the econometric specification and the empirical results. Section 5 concludes 
and summarizes the findings. 
 
 
2. A testscore of skills versus schooling 
When estimating the income or employment gap, earlier studies use (see footnote 1), among 
other things, schooling as their main control for worker productivity. NJ argue that there are 
two  reasons  that  make  this  problematic;  firstly,  schooling  is  an  endogenous  variable  and 
secondly, schooling might be a poor measure of work productivity. Variables used to control 
for  worker  productivity,  such  as  occupation,  post  secondary  education,  part-time  work, 
marital status, geographical location and labor market experience, are endogenous and the 
decisions determining them might be contaminated by ethnic discrimination. 
Hence, using these variables as controls in a wage equation when explaining the black-
white wage gap will lead to the “unexplained” wage gap being overstated, indicating that 
labor market discrimination is substantial. By using a cognitive test score (the AFQT), taken 
before labor market entry, as a sole measure of skill, the black-white wage gap disappears. 
These findings lead NJ to conclude that labor market discrimination is not responsible for the 
black-white  wage  gap,  which  is  instead  the  result  of  a  skill  gap  between  the  groups. 
Furthermore, using schooling and labor market experience as controls for skill in the wage 
equation means that we “confuse the barriers that black children face in acquiring human 
capital with the obstacles that black adults face when they enter the labor market” (NJ, p. 871). 
Achievement test scores have been used for a long time as a control for ability in wage 
equations, especially when estimating the causal return to schooling. Contrary to Herrstein 
and Murray (1994), who argue that the AFQT mostly measures inherent ability, studies have 
shown  that  the  test  score  rises  with  both  schooling  and  age,  indicating  that  it  not  only   5 
measures  inherited  ability  (Hansen  et  al.,  2004,  Neal  and  Johnson,  1996,  Winship  and 
Korenman, 1997).  
Carneiro et al. (2005) reexamine the NJ approach. Although supporting the strategy in 
principle, they claim that, since schooling affects the test score, gaps when taking schooling 
into account are also relevant. The test score may be contaminated by ethnic discrimination if 
second generation immigrants decide to invest in less schooling than natives because of an 
anticipation of future labor market discrimination. Thus, with a schooling-adjusted test score, 
Carneiro et al. explain half of the black-white male wage gap. 
 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
The  empirical  analysis  is  based  on  a  data  set  constructed  by  integrating  registers  from 
Statistics Sweden (SCB) and the Swedish National Service Administration (“Pliktverket” in 
Swedish),  which  identify  individuals  by  their  social  security  numbers,  and  contain  every 
individual living in Sweden in the year 2003.
2 Second generation immigrants are identified 
from the registers as being born in Sweden and having at least one parent born abroad. Since 
we only have information from the Swedish Enlistment Battery for certain age groups, we 
restrict the sample to only males who were 28-38 years old in 2003. The original data then 
includes information on 500,965 native men and 77,267 second generation immigrant men. 
We then divide the data into ten different groups of second generation immigrants. First, 
we  identify  whether  one  or  both  parents  are  foreign-born.  Second,  following  Rooth  and 
Ekberg (2003), we categorize the second generation immigrants according to parental region 
of birth: Nordic countries, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Southern Europe and outside 
Europe (excluding North America and Oceania).
3 This categorization is basically based on 
differences in labor market outcomes within the first generation, see Rooth and Ekberg (2003) 
for  a  thorough  discussion.  Even  though  the  non-European  category  constitutes  a  very 
heterogeneous  population,  it  is  not  meaningful  to  divide  the  category  further  since  there 
would be too few cases in each region of origin. Sample sizes for each group of second 
generation immigrants are found in Table 1.  
                                                            
2 The individuals also have to live in Sweden for the year 1999 because many important variables, e.g. 
the  Swedish  Military  Enlistment  Test  and  the  family  information,  are  collected  from  the  1999 
population data.  
3 See appendix for what countries are included in each region.   6 
Individuals with a mixed foreign background, i.e. where both parents are born abroad but 
in different countries, are excluded (they constitute only six percent of the second generation 
immigrant population in this age group), to ensure a distinctive parental background of the 
second  generation  immigrants.  This  restriction  reduces  the  second  generation  immigrant 
population  to  71,721  men.  The  data  indicates  that  a  large  majority  of  immigrants  have 
children  with  a  native  Swede  as  their  father/mother.  In  fact,  seventy-one  percent  of  the 
children born in Sweden to immigrant parent(s) in our sample have one native parent.  
We continue by showing the key variables for the second generation in Table 1. The 
income variable is for the year 2003 and measures annual income from work, but does not 
include self-employed incomes. When estimating the income equation we restrict the sample 
to individuals who were employed in the third week of November and had an income from 
work above SEK 50,000 (about EURO 5,500). Using these restrictions, instead of simply 
using positive earnings, is an attempt to delete shorter employment spells and part-time jobs 
with low pay. Such a threshold should give an estimate that comes closer to the one expected 
for (log) hourly wages (if such data was available), since higher incomes are more likely to be 
based on similar amounts of time worked (hours and weeks). The income sample includes 84 
percent of  the  natives and 78 percent of the second generation immigrants.  There is also 
variation within the group of second generation immigrants. The lowest share in the income 
sample, 63 percent, is found for those with  both parents from outside of Europe and the 
highest, 83 percent, is found for those with both parents from Western Europe. In section 4.3 
we discuss whether the income sample restrictions are selective and thus affect our results.   
The  Swedish  Military  Enlistment  Test  is  intended  to  measure  cognitive  ability.
4 The 
individuals in this study have taken the Enlistment Battery 80, which includes four separate 
tests, Instructions, Synonyms, Metal Folding and Technical Comprehension. The test score 
variable is on a continuous (stanine) scale ranging from 1 to 9. Information on the result of the 
Enlistment  test  is  for  11  percent  of  the  natives  and  19  percent  of  the  second  generation 
immigrants missing. The lowest participation rate, 49 percent, is found for those with both 
parents from outside of Europe. The reason why a smaller share of this group has participated 
in the test is mainly that fewer of them are Swedish citizens. A more detailed examination of 
the variable is found in the appendix, where the reasons why there is missing information for 
some individuals are also listed. The measure of years of schooling is constructed from the 
                                                            
4 The general intelligence factor, G, is the variable actually used in this study. For more information 
about the G factor, see Caroll (1993).   7 
Swedish version of the educational attainment variable ISCED97 and is distributed between 
nine to twenty years of schooling.  
Descriptives of the key variables, annual income, years of schooling and the test score, 
are  given  for  natives and  second  generation immigrant  groups,  respectively,  see  Table  1. 
Despite the fact that five years have passed since the study by Rooth and Ekberg (2003), the 
basic  picture  remains.
5 Male  second  generation  immigrants  with  both  parents  born  in 
Southern Europe or outside Europe have an annual income that is lower than the income of 
natives. Moreover, despite a relatively high education level, these groups also have low scores 
in the Swedish Military Enlistment Test.  
 
*** Table 1 about here *** 
 
For second generation immigrants with a Western or Eastern European background, the 
income  difference  to  natives  is  largely  positive.  These  groups  of  second  generation 
immigrants have, on average, a high education level and a high score in the Swedish Military 
Enlistment  Test.  Second  generation  immigrants  with  a  Nordic  background  are  the  least 
educated group and have incomes that are lower than natives’ ones. In addition, within each 
ethnic group, individuals with one native parent tend to perform better than individuals with 
two  parents  born  abroad.  Thus,  these  descriptive  results  show  that  there  are  definitely 
differences  in  terms  of  human  capital  between  the  different  groups  of  second  generation 
immigrants  as  well  as  compared  to  natives.  In  the  next  section  we  will  explore  these 





In this section we start by giving a picture of the income differences between natives and the 
different groups of second generation immigrants. Then, and in line with the NJ approach, we 
use  the  Enlistment  Battery  test  score  as  the  sole  predictor  of  the  income  gap  between 
                                                            
5 The second-generation’s young age and the fact that labor market outcomes during younger ages 
often have a low correlation with lifetime income raise questions about whether the results in Rooth 
and Ekberg were temporary or not. The findings here indicate that lower incomes for these second 
generation immigrants are likely to persist into the future.   8 
comparable natives and second generation immigrants, i.e. those of the same age and living in 
the same labor market area. When explaining differences in incomes between natives and 
second generation immigrants our test score is likely to capture, besides differences in family 
background,  institutional  factors  that  differ  between  the  groups.  For  instance,  school  and 
neighborhood characteristics might give rise to skill differences between natives and second 
generation immigrants.  We then compare the share of the income gap explained with the test 
score to the share explained with the regular set of control variables, with special interest 
given to the schooling variable. Finally, we conduct sensitivity analysis of the results. 
 
4.1 The income gap    
A  very  simple  strategy  is  used  to  estimate  the  income  gap  between  natives  and  second 
generation  immigrants.  In  a  pooled  model,  including  natives  and  second  generation 
immigrants, the income gaps are arrived at by regressing income on the ten ethnic indicator 
variables. In column (1) in Table 2 age
6, age squared and labor market region are controlled 
for.
7 A negative income difference relative to natives is found for those with parent(s) born in 
the Nordic countries, Southern Europe or outside Europe. This difference tends to be larger, 
about twice the size, for those with both parents born abroad compared to one parent born in 
Sweden. Hence, the main picture is that the labor market situation, relative to natives, varies a 
lot between the different groups of second generation immigrants, and that only relatively few 
of them tend to be adversely affected. In the following we primarily discuss the results for the 
second generation groups with a Nordic, Southern European or non-European background, i.e. 
the groups found to have a significant income difference compared to natives in column (1).  
 
*** Table 2 about here *** 
 
                                                            
6 Using yearly age dummies instead of the continuous age variable does not change the results in this 
study. 
7 Thus, contrary to NJ, we control for labor market region, which is a broad area definition. Because 
ethnicity is strongly related to residing in an urban region where salaries are higher than outside the 
urban regions, the income gap will be underestimated if labor market region is not controlled for. We 
argue  that excluding labour  market region  from the model yields  a  more  serious  misspecification 
compared to including a potentially endogenous labour market variable.   9 
When  regressing  (log)income  on  the  Military  Enlistment  Test  score  and  the  ethnic 
dummies, column (2), we find that the income gap is reduced for most of these groups.
8 In 
fact, using the test score as the sole predictor explains about 70 percent of the income gap for 
individuals with both parents born in Southern Europe or outside of Europe. Hence, for these 
groups  of  second  generation  immigrants  the  income  gap  primarily  mirrors  a  skill  gap. 
Interestingly, after controlling for skill, the income gap to natives is larger for those with one 
parent born in Southern Europe or outside of Europe than for those with both parents born in 
these regions. For second generation immigrants with both parents born in a Nordic country 
or  one  parent  born  in  Southern  Europe,  approximately  40  percent  of  the  income  gap  is 
explained by a skill gap.  
In  line  with  the  NJ  strategy,  parental  socioeconomic  background
9 is  another  relevant 
exogenous variable that should be included in the income equation. Column (3) shows the 
income  gap  when  including  both  the  test  score  and  parental  background  in  the  income 
equation.  The  finding  that  the  income  gap  turns  small  and  insignificant  for  the  second 
generation immigrants with both parents born in Southern Europe or outside Europe clearly 
shows  that  the  skills  and  the  socioeconomic  family  capital,  that  individuals  bring  to  the 
market explain the main part of the income differences vis-à-vis natives.  
It could be that the skill level of second generation immigrants is foremost related to the 
parental  background. To test this assumption  we omit the test score and control only for 
parental background, i.e. parental income and education level, in the income equation, see 
column (4). For those with both parents born in Southern Europe or outside of Europe, we 
find that the socioeconomic position of the parents explains less, around forty percent, of the 
income gap compared to what is explained by the test score. The test score therefore captures 
more than merely the socioeconomic background for these groups. 
In comparison, column (5) shows the income gap, and the share explained, when again 
omitting the test score but including years of schooling, occupation (using a total of twenty-
four fixed effects for a 2-digit occupation classification), marital status and family background 
in the model. For second generation immigrants with both parents born in Southern Europe or 
outside of Europe, these variables only explain around 30-40 percent of the income gap to 
                                                            
8 The results in the paper do not change if a more flexible specification is used, i.e. using indicator 
variables instead of a continuous  test  score  variable. The same is true for the years of schooling 
variable.  
9 We use the parents’ years of schooling and annual income, measured in the period 1970 to 1980. The 
appendix describes these variables in more detail.    10 
natives, i.e. a similar share as is explained with the socioeconomic position of the parents but 
much less, approximately half, of what is explained with the test score. This finding indicates 
that  the  income  gap  for  these  groups  is  overstated  when  including  possibly  endogenous 
variables in the earnings equation.  
However, for the other second generation immigrant groups found to have a significant 
income  gap  in  column  (1),  this  set  of  controls  explains  more  of  the  income  gap  than  is 
explained with the test score. We have not found an explanation for why this is the case. For 
male second generation immigrants with a parental background in Western or Eastern Europe, 
the size of the gap, which is small to begin with, is only marginally affected. 
Years of schooling might, for numerous reasons, be a poor measure of productive skills. 
For example, second generation immigrants might invest in education because they have, or 
perceive themselves to have, problems obtaining work. The skill level of second generation 
immigrants  might  then  be  lower  than  the  skill  level  of  natives  with  the  same  level  of 
education.  For  second  generation  immigrants  with  both  parents  originating  from  southern 
Europe or outside Europe this might be especially true since we see in Table 1 that their test 
score was low whereas their education level was relatively high. In column (6) in Table 2 
years of schooling is used as a single control for productive skill. Whereas the income gap to 
natives,  for  second  generation  immigrants  with  both  parents  born  in  Southern  Europe  or 
outside of Europe, may almost entirely be explained by differences in skills as measured by 
the test score, only around 15 percent of the gap may be explained by differences in years of 
schooling. Only for those with parent(s) born in a Nordic country does years of schooling 
explain a share of the income gap similar to that of the test score.  
In column (7), where we control for both the test score and years of schooling, we explain 
less of the income gap for those with both parents born in Southern Europe or outside of 
Europe compared to when we only control for the test score (column 2). This result indicates 
that these groups of second generation immigrants, relative to their skill level, invest in more 




4.2 What type of skill is most important? 
We continue our analysis by finding out what type of skill is most important for explaining 
the income gap between natives and second generation immigrants. As previously mentioned, 
the test actually comprises four separate tests: Instructions, Synonyms, Metal Folding and   11 
Technical Comprehension. The aim of the Instruction test is to measure an individual’s ability 
to make inductions. It also, together with the Synonyms test, captures verbal ability. Metal 
Folding is a spatial test, i.e. it is more related to mathematic skills and the fourth test measures 
technical comprehension in general.  
Table 3 shows the results of estimating the income equation, when including each test 
score  separately  in  the  model,  in columns  (1)  to  (4).
10 When  adding  the  Instructions  test 
(column  1),  or  the  Synonyms  test  (column  2),  to  the  income  equation,  the  income  gap 
between  second  generation  immigrants,  with  both  parents  foreign-born  (neglecting  the 
categories Western and Eastern Europe), and natives is smaller compared to when the Metal 
Folding test (column  3) or the Technical Comprehension test (column 4) is added to the 
equation. On the contrary, we find no difference between the income gaps of the tests when 
only  one  parent  is  foreign  born.  These  results  indicate  that  language  proficiency  is  an 
especially important part of skills for those with both parents foreign-born but not for those 
with only one foreign-born parent, where all types of measured skills are equally important.  
 
*** Table 3 about here *** 
 
It is also important to mention that the different skills measured by the tests are found to be 
highly  correlated.  The  combined  test  score  also  explains  more  of  the  income  difference 
compared to any of the separate tests used alone (which can be seen from comparing the 
results in Table 3 with those in column (2) in Table 2). 
 
4.3 Sensitivity analysis 
In this section we analyze whether the test score needs to be schooling-adjusted, whether the 
test might have en ethnic bias and whether the income restriction might change the results.   
 
Does the test score need to be schooling-adjusted? 
                                                            
10 The relationship between logarithmic income and each of the four test scores differ with respect to 
linearity. Therefore the squared test score variable is not included in the model, since it makes it hard 
to interpret and compare the four test score coefficients. The income gaps  are hardly affected by 
excluding the squared variable from the model.   12 
An achievement test score might be related to education and past experience and hence, our 
skill measure might not be fixed. The Swedish Military Enlistment Test is for a majority
11 of 
the  individuals taken when turning 18, i.e. during the latter part of their  upper-secondary 
schooling. This means that postsecondary schooling and labour market experience should not 
affect the result on the test. We therefore have a skill measure that has not been contaminated 
by labour market discrimination after age 18. 
However, second generation immigrants might decide to invest in less schooling than 
natives  because  of  an  anticipation  of  future  labour  market  discrimination.  Therefore,  if 
schooling affects the test score results up to age 18, the test scores might also be contaminated 
by ethnic discrimination. Hence, Carneiro et al. (2005) suggest that an appropriate correction 
of the NJ strategy is to adjust the test score for schooling at the test date. 
Another strategy for tackling the problem is to re-estimate the earnings equation for the 
sample of individuals with the same level of education when taking the test, i.e. for those who 
attend  upper-secondary  school  at  the  test  date;  see  also  Nordin  (2007)  for  use  of  this 
strategy.
12 If the results do not change when making this restriction we claim that it is not 
necessary to adjust for upper-secondary schooling in this dataset.  
Column (1) of Table 4 shows the age- and labor market-adjusted income gap for those 
with at least twelve years of schooling. In column (2) the test score is added to the model. In 
comparison to the results in Table 2 (columns (1) and (2)) the size of the income gap changes 
somewhat for some of the second generation immigrant groups which has the implication that 
the relative share explained also changes somewhat (compare the share explained in column 
(2) in Table 2 with column (3) in Table 4). The changes in the relative share explained are 
however not in any way (neither in magnitude nor in direction) affecting our overall results. 
Thus, our conclusion is that the test score does not need to be schooling-adjusted. 
 
*** Table 4 about here *** 
 
                                                            
11 Around 17 percent take the test at age 19, and about 3 percent take it when between ages 20 to 27. The 
relatively large group of nineteen-year-olds is because of random delays and illness at the test date (in most cases 
this means that the individual enlists in the beginning of the next year, i.e. still during upper-secondary school)  
(Pliktverket, Guttormsson, 2000). Two other reasons for taking the test at an older age are that the individual is 
abroad when turning 18 or gets a Swedish citizenship after the age of 18. As these two ievents are, reasonably, 
more common for second-generation immigrants than natives, the test score result is more likely to be biased 
upwards than downwards for second-generation immigrants, meaning that we underestimate the share of the 
income gap explained with the test score.  
12 However, we only have information about completed years of schooling in 2003 and not completed years of 
schooling at test date. So also in this sample, individuals who complete upper-secondary education at an older 
age than what is common have received less schooling at the test date.   13 
Does the test have an ethnic bias? 
If the performance on the achievement tests is ethnically biased this might explain the low test 
score result for second generation immigrants with both parents born in Southern Europe or 
outside Europe. The true ability level of these second generation immigrants might then be 
higher than their measured ability level. If this is the case the income gap when controlling for 
ability level may be biased and indicate less discrimination than is actually the case. 
Carneiro et al. (2005) suggest that if the market return to skill is the same for blacks and 
whites the test score is not likely to be ethnically biased.
13 The intuition is that if there is an 
ethnic bias individual skills are measured with error for blacks but not for whites, which in 
turn will create a bias in the estimate of the return to skills for blacks. Therefore, a simple test 
of ethnic bias is to analyze whether the return to skill differs for second generation immigrants 
and natives.
14 This is done by including an interaction between the test result (and the test 
result squared) and a second generation immigrant dummy in the model.  
 
 
In Table 5 (column 1) the result when estimating this model is reported. By examining the 
interaction variables we can decide whether the return to skill differs between natives and 
second  generation immigrants.  Since  the  estimates  of  the  interaction  terms  are  small and 
insignificant the  return  to  skill  does  not  seem to  differ  for  second  generation immigrants 
compared to natives.  
Also, including a separate interaction variable for the second generation immigrants with 
both parents from southern Europe and outside Europe gives the same result as an interaction 
variable  for  all  second  generation  immigrants.  This  indicates  that  the  test  score  is  not 
ethnically biased. 
 
 *** Table 5 about here *** 
 
Are the results affected by the income restriction? 
                                                            
13 However, they discuss a related, but not identical, problem, namely whether a "stereotype threat" causes the 
black-white test score gap. A stereotype threat implies that a negative stereotype about the particular ethnic 
group is being internalized by the individual, and thereby affecting the performance on achievement tests. 
14 Another possible explanation for a same return to skill estimate for natives and second generation immigrant 
might be that discrimination, biasing the estimate of the return to skills downward, exactly cancels out the ethnic 
bias, biasing the estimate of the return to skills upward.  
 
 
   14 
As mentioned our choice of using SEK 50,000 is somewhat arbitrary and one might wonder 
how sensitive the results are to this choice? Table 6, column (1), shows that instead using 
SEK 100,000 as the income restriction changes the size of the baseline income gap (compared 
to column (1) in table 2) and makes it smaller. When we include the test score in the income 
equation (column (2) in table 6) the change in the size of the income gap is as large as found 
when using SEK 50,000, and the qualitative results remain.  
Also, if there are group differences in labor force participation then these selection effects 
could contaminate the estimates of ethnic differences in annual earnings. By attributing an 
income of 50,000 SEK to everyone without income as well as those with incomes below 
50,000 SEK  and then estimate median regressions we  test  whether  selective participation 
affects the results. Kolla rooth Ekberg) alt. tidig version inget instrument därför detta 
 The income differences toward natives are then somewhat larger but the test score still 
explains the same absolute number, i.e. log points, of the gap. Hence, the qualitative results 
remain. These results are available upon request. 
 
*** Table 6 about here *** 
 
5. Conclusions 
The income gap between native and second generation immigrant men varies a great deal 
with family origin and with whether one or both of the parents is born abroad. The income 
gap  is  especially  large,  varying  between  6  to  12  percent,  for  male  second  generation 
immigrants  with  one  or  both  parents  born  in  Southern  Europe  or  outside  Europe.  Since 
previous research has shown that this income difference does not disappear when age, region 
of residence and years of schooling are controlled for the conclusion has been that ethnic 
discrimination  might  be  the  explanation.  However,  instead  we  find  that  the  income  gap 
depends strongly on a skill gap. Once the result on the Swedish Military Enlistment Test is 
controlled  for,  the  income  gap  almost  disappears  for  these  groups  of  second  generation 
immigrants.  
This difference in results is most likely explained by the fact that years of schooling is a 
bad measure of productive skills. When only controlling for the socioeconomic background, 
as measured by the parents’ incomes and level of schooling, and for the test score, the income 
gap in fact becomes insignificant for these second generation immigrants. When using the 
regular  set  of  control  variables,  or  just  years  of  schooling,  the  income  gap  becomes 
overestimated, i.e. large and significant, for second generation immigrants with both parents   15 
born in southern Europe or outside of Europe. This result also indicates that these groups try 
to compensate for problems of becoming employed and therefore invest (in relation to their 
skill level) in more schooling than natives. This result is in line with the result for blacks in 
the US found in the Neal and Johnson study. 
It is important to emphasize that the skill gap for second generation immigrants with a 
background in Southern Europe or outside Europe is not a reflection of the socioeconomic 
position of the parents, i.e. intergenerational transmission is not the only explanation of why 
these  groups  have  lower  skills  than  natives.  Although  the  second  generation  generally 
succeeds  better  on  the  Swedish  labor  market  than  the  corresponding  first  generation 
immigrants something affects their skill level, and therefore also their labor market outcome, 
negatively. Further research should try to find out what that something is.  
By separating the test score into different measures of skills, such as verbal, technical and 
mathematical skills, our results indicate that it is foremost verbal skills that are inferior. We 
agree with Neal and Johnson that a first place to look is for differences in neighborhood and 
school characteristics. Such institutional factors might create obstacles to acquiring productive 
skills, and especially verbal skills, for these second generation immigrants. In this respect not 
only children born in Sweden to foreign-born parents should be considered but also first-
generation immigrants arriving to Sweden during childhood. 
However,  our  skill  measure  does  not explain  the  income  gap  towards  natives for  all 
groups of second generation immigrants. For male second generation immigrants with one 
Swedish-born parent and the other born in Southern Europe or outside Europe and for male 
second  generation  immigrants  with  both  parents  born  in  the  Nordic  countries  a  small 
unexplained income gap remains. The reasons for this difference is unclear. 
To conclude, our results suggest that employers focus primarily on skills when deciding 
upon wages for the employed. Actually, we find no indications that ethnic discrimination 
creates lower wages for men born in Sweden with a foreign background compared to native 
Swedish men, given equal skills. However, in this study we have primarily focused on only 
one part of the picture. The gap in the probability to become employed between native and 
second generation immigrant men is not explained by a corresponding skill gap. And since no 
other  observed  factor  seems  to  explain  the  employment  gap  between  natives  and  second 
generation immigrants, ethnic discrimination might be a factor that determines employment. 
In  fact,  the  field  experimental  study  by  Carlsson  and  Rooth  (2006)  finds  that  ethnic 
discrimination  in  hiring  exists  in  the  Swedish  labor  market.  Taken  together,  the  findings 
indicate that ethnic discrimination might affect the probability to become employed, but ones   16 
employed  the  labour  market  income  of  second  generation  immigrants  is  not  affected  by 
discrimination. Thus, to gain a complete perspective concerning ethnic discrimination future 
research needs to further examine the probability to become employed.   17 
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Appendix:  
The Swedish Military Enlistment Battery test 
The score on the four separate tests (Instructions, Synonyms, Metal Folding and Technical 
Comprehension)  is  summed  up,  in  accordance  with  the  method  of  factor  analysis,  and 
transformed into a normalized scale (a so called stanine scale) going from one to nine. The 
method for calculating the test score has changed during the time period. But because our data 
contains the results of the separate tests we are able to construct a test result that is time 
consistent. When there is information missing for one, two or three of the separate test score 
results we use the average of the other test score results as a proxy for the missing test score 
result. The time consistent test score is a continuous variable (3,993 values from 1.01 to 9.11). 
The original G variable is a discrete variable going from 1 to 9. 
Five percent of the second generation immigrants are lost because they do not enlist into 
the military because of a foreign citizenship (conditional on being included in the income 
sample). However, for some individuals the separate test scores are missing (which are used 
when constructing the time consistent test score variable) which means that we lose seven 
percent of the second generation immigrants and six percent of the natives from the sample. 
For another seven percent of the second generation immigrants and for four percent of the 
natives enlistment data is entirely missing. Most of these individuals probably have legitimate 
health  reasons  for  not  enlisting  into  the  military.  In  2000  (the  latest  year  for  which  this 
information is available), 7 percent of the cohort did not have to enlist because of health 
reasons. 
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Table A1.  Results from estimating the employment gap between second generation immigrant and native 
men. 2003. Percentage points. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Two parents born abroad:           
The Nordic countries    ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
% explained   ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
Western Europe          ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
% explained   ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
Eastern Europe          ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
% explained   ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
Southern Europe       ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
% explained      ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
Outside Europe         ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
% explained     ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
One parent born abroad:   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
The Nordic countries    ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
% explained   ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
Western Europe        ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
% explained   ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
Eastern Europe         ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
% explained    ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
Southern Europe         ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
% explained     ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
Outside Europe          ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
% explained    ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
           
Test score             .062 (.00)***    .060 (.00)***     
Test score
2        .005 (.00)***   .004 (.00)***     
Schooling              .008 (.00)***   .001 (.00)***   
Married        no     no                 no                 no                 yes       
Family Background    no      no                  yes             no                  yes            
           
R
2              .013  .020            .023  .015            ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
N                   498,033  498,033  498,033  498,033  498,033 
                 
Notes: The dependent variable is being employed, as measured by Statistics Sweden, for at least one hour in 
the third week of November 2003.  In the baseline model, column (1), we control for age, age squared and 
labor market region. In column (2) the test score is added, and in column (3) we also add family background 
to the baseline model. In column (4) only years of schooling is added to the baseline model, while in column 
(5) schooling, married and family background are added to the baseline model. The reported coefficients are 
the effects when estimating a linear probability model. 
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1 #￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿0￿ ￿￿￿ ￿5 $ ￿ ￿￿#￿ ￿￿￿￿ $ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ $ % ￿￿ ￿￿￿
0￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ -+ ￿ ( ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ( ￿ ￿( * ￿ ￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿ ￿￿+ ￿ ￿-+ ￿ ( ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿% ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
-#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 2 ￿￿￿ ? ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 2 ￿￿
5 2 ￿ ￿ 5 ￿#￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ * ￿ * ￿￿￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿￿$ ￿ ￿,￿ ￿￿￿￿ 2 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿( ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿￿$ ￿ ￿,￿ ￿￿￿￿ 2 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿0* ￿￿ ,@￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿( ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
: ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ( ￿ : ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ( ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ 2 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ( ￿% ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿% ￿￿
1 ##* % ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ( ￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿￿  ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ #￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ( ￿ ￿ ##￿ ￿( ￿￿ 2 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿( ￿2 ￿￿￿ ￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ --? / ￿
￿-￿￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿( ￿￿A ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿,￿’￿,￿ ￿,￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿#￿ ￿￿￿ 2 ￿￿￿&￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿( ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ( ￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿￿B$ ￿￿￿￿￿ 2 C￿￿ ##* % ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
&￿ ￿￿￿-#￿ ￿￿ ￿ &￿ ￿ ￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ * ￿ * ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿￿ 2 ￿￿￿￿ $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
&￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ &￿ ￿ ￿￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ * ￿￿￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ $ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
: ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿@￿￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿@￿￿￿￿ #￿ $ ￿ ￿ 5 ￿ ￿￿  ￿ ￿￿ 2 ￿ ￿￿￿ #￿ $ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿’￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ #￿ $ ￿ ￿￿￿￿"￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿#￿ ￿￿￿
: ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿@￿￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿@￿￿￿ ( * #￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 8 ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ( * #￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ’￿￿￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿ ￿ ￿( * $ $ ’￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿#￿ $ % * ￿￿￿ ￿’)￿
* % % ￿ ￿￿￿￿ #￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿’)￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿’)￿￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿’￿￿ ￿￿> ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿( ￿ 2 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿￿￿* #￿￿ ( ￿￿&￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ #￿ ￿2 ￿￿ * % ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿@￿￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿@￿￿￿ ( * #￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿  ￿ ￿￿￿
: ￿￿￿￿￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿@￿￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿@￿￿￿ ( * #￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿  ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿ ( ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
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Tables: 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of native and second generation immigrant men (income sample). 2003 
￿￿ ￿ ￿ 2 ￿5 ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿ ? ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ &￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 0￿
￿ "￿ #￿ $ ￿ ￿ -#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 2 ￿ -#￿ ￿￿ ￿ 0￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
0￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
0￿ ￿( ￿#￿#￿ * ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
4 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
. ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
-￿ * ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
1 * ￿￿￿( ￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
0￿ ￿( ￿#￿#￿ * ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
4 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
. ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
-￿ * ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
1 * ￿￿￿( ￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
            
Notes: The descriptive statistics are for individuals belonging to the income sample, i.e. who are employed and 
have an income above SEK 50,000 in 2003. The average test score is calculated for the sample who has taken 
the Enlistment Test. In parenthesis the standard deviation of log annual income, the share belonging to the 
income sample, and the share who has taken the Enlistment test (conditional on being included in the income 
sample), respectively, are given.  
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Table 2. Results from estimating the income gap between second generation immigrant and native men. 2003. Log points. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)   (6)   (7) 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
&￿ ￿ ￿0￿ ￿( ￿#￿#￿ * ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
D ￿￿ 9% ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
4 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
D ￿￿ 9% ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
. ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
D ￿￿ 9% ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
-￿ * ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
D ￿￿ 9% ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
1 * ￿￿￿( ￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
D ￿￿ 9% ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
&￿ ￿ ￿0￿ ￿( ￿#￿#￿ * ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
D ￿￿ 9% ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
4 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
D ￿￿ 9% ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
. ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
D ￿￿ 9% ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
-￿ * ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
D ￿￿ 9% ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
1 * ￿￿￿( ￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
D ￿￿ 9% ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
&￿ ￿￿￿￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
&￿ ￿￿￿￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
-#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
: ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
> ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
3 ￿ $ ￿￿’￿6 ￿ #,2 ￿￿ * ￿ ( ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿  23 
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
Notes: The dependent variable is logarithmic annual income. In the baseline model, column (1), we control for age, age squared and labor market 
region. In column (2) the test score is added, and in column (3) we also add family background to the baseline model, while we omit the test score in 
column (4) but keep family background. In column (5) schooling, married, occupation and family background are added to the baseline model, while 
only years of schooling is added to the baseline model in column (6). In the last column only the test score and years of schooling are added to the 
baseline model. Because the income gap is very small and insignificant for the second generation immigrants with a Western and Eastern European 
background computing the explained share has not been computed.   24 
 
Table 3. Results from estimating the income gap between second generation immigrant and native men when 
controlling for different types of tests. 2003. Log points. 
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
0￿ ￿( ￿#￿#￿ * ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
4 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
. ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
-￿ * ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
1 * ￿￿￿( ￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
0￿ ￿( ￿#￿#￿ * ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
4 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
. ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
-￿ * ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
1 * ￿￿￿( ￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
"￿ ￿￿￿* #￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
-’￿ ￿ ￿ ’$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
: ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿3 ￿ ￿( ￿￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
&￿ #￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿￿< ￿ $ % ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
Notes: The dependent variable is logarithmic annual income. In all models we control for age, age squared 
and labour market region. In column (1) the Instructions test is controlled for, in column (2) the Synonyms 
test is controlled for, in column (3) the Metal Folding test is controlled for and in column (4) the Technical 
Comprehension test is controlled for. The number of cases varies across the columns since some individuals 
did not take all four tests.  
 
Table 4. Results from estimating the income gap between second generation immigrant and native men 
for those with at least twelve years of schooling at the test date. 2003. Log points. 
   (1)  (2)  % explained 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
0￿ ￿( ￿#￿#￿ * ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
4 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
. ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
-￿ * ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
1 * ￿￿￿( ￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
0￿ ￿( ￿#￿#￿ * ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
4 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
. ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
-￿ * ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
1 * ￿￿￿( ￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
&￿ ￿￿￿￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
&￿ ￿￿￿￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿  25 
Notes: The dependent variable is logarithmic annual income. In both models we control for age, age 
squared and labour market region. In column (2) the test score is added to the model. Because the 
income gap is very small for second generation immigrants with a Western and Eastern European 
background the explained share has not been computed. 
 
Table 5.  Estimation results when testing whether the return to test score differs for native and second 
generation immigrant men. 2003. Log points. 
   (1) 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
0￿ ￿( ￿#￿#￿ * ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
4 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
. ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
-￿ * ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
1 * ￿￿￿( ￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
0￿ ￿( ￿#￿#￿ * ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
4 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
. ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
-￿ * ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
1 * ￿￿￿( ￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿
&￿ ￿￿￿￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
&￿ ￿￿￿￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
&￿ ￿￿￿￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿-￿ #￿ ￿ ( ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿"$ $ ￿2 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿




     
Notes: The dependent variable is logarithmic annual income. We control for age, age squared and 
labour market region.  
 
Table 6. Results from estimating the income gap between second generation immigrant and 
native men when using 100,000 SEK as the income restriction. 2003. Log points. 
￿ E -. / ￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
0￿ ￿( ￿#￿#￿ * ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
D ￿￿ 9% ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
4 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
D ￿￿ 9% ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
. ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
D ￿￿ 9% ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
-￿ * ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
D ￿￿ 9% ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
1 * ￿￿￿( ￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
D ￿￿ 9% ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
0￿ ￿( ￿#￿#￿ * ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
D ￿￿ 9% ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
4 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
D ￿￿ 9% ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿  26 
. ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
D ￿￿ 9% ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
-￿ * ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
D ￿￿ 9% ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
1 * ￿￿￿( ￿ ￿. * ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
D ￿￿ 9% ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿
&￿ ￿￿￿￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿





Notes: The dependent variable is logarithmic annual income. We control for age, age squared 
and labour market region. In column (2) the test score is added to the model. 
 
 